Files
ATOCore/tests
Anto01 336208004c ops: add restore_runtime_backup + drill runbook
Close the backup side of the loop: we had create/list/validate but
no restore, and no documented drill. A backup you've never restored
is not a backup. This lands the missing restore surface and the
procedure to exercise it before enabling any write-path automation
(auto-capture, automated ingestion, reinforcement sweeps).

Code — src/atocore/ops/backup.py:

- restore_runtime_backup(stamp, *, include_chroma, pre_restore_snapshot,
  confirm_service_stopped) performs:
  1. validate_backup() gate — refuse on any error
  2. pre-restore safety snapshot of current state (reversibility anchor)
  3. PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE) on target db (flush + release
     OS handles; Windows needs this after conn.backup() reads)
  4. unlink stale -wal/-shm sidecars (tolerant to Windows lock races)
  5. shutil.copy2 snapshot db over target
  6. restore registry if snapshot captured one
  7. restore Chroma tree if snapshot captured one and include_chroma
     resolves to true (defaults to whether backup has Chroma)
  8. PRAGMA integrity_check on restored db, report result
- Refuses without confirm_service_stopped=True to prevent hot-restore
  into a running service (would corrupt SQLite state)
- Rewrote main() as argparse with 4 subcommands: create, list,
  validate, restore. `python -m atocore.ops.backup restore STAMP
  --confirm-service-stopped` is the drill CLI entry point, run via
  `docker compose run --rm --entrypoint python atocore` so it reuses
  the live service's volume mounts

Tests — tests/test_backup.py (6 new):

- test_restore_refuses_without_confirm_service_stopped
- test_restore_raises_on_invalid_backup
- test_restore_round_trip_reverses_post_backup_mutations
  (canonical drill flow: seed -> backup -> mutate -> restore ->
   mutation gone + baseline survived + pre-restore snapshot has
   the mutation captured as rollback anchor)
- test_restore_round_trip_with_chroma
- test_restore_skips_pre_snapshot_when_requested
- test_restore_cleans_stale_wal_sidecars (asserts stale byte
  markers do not survive, not file existence, since PRAGMA
  integrity_check may legitimately recreate -wal)

Docs — docs/backup-restore-drill.md (new):

- What gets backed up (hot sqlite, cold chroma, registry JSON,
  metadata.json) and what doesn't (.env, source content)
- What restore does, step by step, and why confirm_service_stopped
  is a hard gate
- 8-step drill procedure: capture -> baseline -> mutate -> stop ->
  restore -> start -> verify marker gone -> optional cleanup
- Correct endpoint bodies verified against routes.py:
    POST /admin/backup with JSON body {"include_chroma": true}
    POST /memory with memory_type/content/project/confidence
    GET /memory?project=drill to list drill markers
    POST /query with {"prompt": ..., "top_k": ...} (not "query")
- Failure modes: integrity_check fail, container won't start,
  marker still present after restore, with remediation for each
- When to run: before new write-path automation, after backup.py
  or schema changes, after infra bumps, monthly as standing check

225/225 tests passing (219 existing + 6 new restore).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-08 21:17:48 -04:00
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